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Greece has been living beyond its means for a long time now and 
has accumulated foreign debt. The high level of national debt is 
merely a reflection of the problems; the actual cause is insufficient 
economic power. The top-priority political objective is to strengthen 
the substance of the economy—in particular, the export base—to 
such an extent that in future, the balance of payments is at least 
equalized. This means Greece needs a growth strategy to catch-up 
industrialization. 
So far, revenue in the economic exchange with other countries has 
been mainly generated by tourism. However, this pillar is far from 
sufficient; although there are growth prospects in tourism in sou-
thern Europe, these should not be overestimated. On the other hand, 
Greece‘s industrial base is only small and heavily biased towards the 
domestic market. Its production structure and foreign trade links for 
goods show that the Greek economy presents virtually no competi-
tion for developed industrialized nations. Consequently, contrary to 
claims, the wage restraint in Germany has not put the Greek eco-
nomy under significant pressure, either. The manufacturing sector 
and large sections of the economy are to a large extent marked by 
small-scale production. Overall, in Greece, there is one self-employed 
worker for every two employees; the employment structure more ty-
pical of a transition economy. 
Although national bankruptcy has not been officially 
declared, the Greek state is effectively insolvent and 
has no means of refinancing on the capital market. In 
2010, the debt accumulated by the state (including so-
cial security payments) reached almost 329 billion eu-
ros; this amount corresponds to 145 percent of the GDP.1 
The level of debt has continued to grow rapidly over the 
last year; the Greek government currently estimates the 
new debt for 2011 at 21.6 billion euros, which is almost 
ten percent of economic performance.2
Whether or not it ends in bankruptcy depends, howe-
ver, not on the amount of debt but on the trustworthi-
ness and the solvency of the debtor. For instance, Japan 
has a much higher level of debt than Greece (amoun-
ting to around 200 percent of its GDP), but can still fi-
nance additional debts and maturing loans at very low 
interest rates—even after the major earthquake, which 
had led to lower tax revenue and higher government ex-
penditure to remedy the damage.3 Consequently, the cre-
ditors, Japanese citizens in the vast majority of cases, at-
tribute an extremely high creditworthiness to the deb-
tor.4 Creditors therefore have confidence that the state 
will pay them the interest accrued and settle its debt by 
the agreed date.
The picture is very different for Greece. When it beca-
me clear in fall 2009 that public borrowing was much 
higher than previously indicated, yields on Greek govern-
ment bonds climbed considerably. As of spring 2010, fi-
nancing problems escalated. Contrary to claims by poli-
ticians, this development was not due to speculation on 
the financial markets, but to the loss of investor confi-
1  Hellenic Statistical Authority, press release, October 27, 2011, preliminary 
data.
2  Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, press release, January 12, 2012.
3  At the time of the earthquake, the ten-year yield on Japanese government 
bonds was at around 1.3 percent and it is currently one percent.
4  W.R. Lam and K. Tokuoka, „Assessing the Risks to the Japanese 
Government Bond (JGB) Market,“ IMF Working Paper, no. 292 (2001). 
Greek Economy Needs Growth Strategy
by karl BrenkeDIW Economic Bulletin 3.2012 4
GREEk Economy nEEDs GRoWth stRatEGy
dence in Greece’s creditworthiness.5 Even financial as-
sistance provided by other countries in the eurozone and 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could only fa-
cilitate a short-term reduction of the high interest rates. 
Bond purchases by the European Central Bank (ECB) 
also had no lasting effect. And the hope shared by many 
politicians in May 2010, when the first bailout package 
was introduced that Greece would quickly be able to re-
finance itself on the bond markets was not fulfilled. It 
was also for this reason that the eurozone countries in 
July 2011 adopted a second recovery package. Because 
the solutions decided upon were considered to be inade-
quate, this led to further negotiations in October 2011. 
Financial institutions and the Greek government have 
just decided on a debt cut, meaning that private creditors 
“voluntarily” write off at least half of their loans to Gree-
ce.6 The national debt could thus be reduced by around 
100 billion euros. The majority of the remaining debt 
would then be distributed among international institu-
tions and, thus, indirectly, other countries. This share 
will continue to grow since Greece will receive further 
financial assistance of 100 billion euros up until 2014, 
plus another 30 billion euros to cover private creditors 
for the planned debt cut.7 Even if forecasts made as part 
of the most recent recovery measures prove to be right, 
the country is still expected to have a debt burden of 
120 percent of its GDP in the year 2020.
lost confidence in Economic 
Performance
As far as both EU and German politicians are concer-
ned, the financial problems of Greece and some other 
states in the eurozone are seen as a public debt crisis. 
If this were the case, however, that would mean, for ex-
ample, Japan has been insolvent for a long time now. 
Apparently, sufficient economic potential is attributed 
to this country to repay the debt. This is hardly surpri-
sing because up until 2011, Japan consistently genera-
ted foreign trade surpluses and consequently was not 
dependent on capital from abroad. Greece’s capacity, 
on the other hand, is deemed to be insufficient by po-
tential financial backers. We are not just dealing with a 
public debt crisis, but, more importantly, the country’s 
economic power is considered to be so weak that it can-
not carry its debt burden.
5  M.G. Arghyroua and A. Kontonikasb, „The EMU sovereign-debt crisis: 
Fundamentals, expectations and contagion. European Economy,“ Economic 
Papers, no. 436 (2011).
6  At the euro summit of 26 October 2011, bank representatives agreed in 
principle to write off approx. half of the debt. The banks represented at the 
relevant negotiations cannot speak for all private creditors, however.
7  Decision of the European Council of October 2011, Brussels, October 26, 
2011.
Therefore, proposed solutions aiming only at countries 
such as Greece reducing their public expenditure and in-
creasing their government revenue are not far-reaching 
enough. These may even prevent the country from achie-
ving its objective—long-term consolidation of public 
budgets. As experience with the government austerity 
measures already introduced in Greece shows, they have 
considerable negative repercussions for the economic 
cycle and lead to reduced revenue and increased public 
sector expenditure, for instance, for social security bene-
fits. Thus, the situation regarding public budgets deteri-
orated again in 2011.8 An austerity policy cannot serve to 
strengthen the economic base—on the contrary. 
Surprisingly, this aspect is largely ignored in the debate 
surrounding the euro crisis and, apart from some eco-
nomically adventurous ideas,9 only vague structural re-
forms10 are said to be necessary in order to strengthen 
the economic base. Or there is a call for money from the 
European Structural Funds and other special funds to 
be concentrated on crisis countries such as Greece11—
it remains unclear exactly which countries these are, 
what this is meant to achieve, and how other beneficia-
ries will react towards this.
In the following analysis, the economic development 
of the past decade and fundamental structures of the 
Greek economy will be outlined so as to identify wea-
knesses and find indications of whether, under the gi-
ven circumstances, there are in fact any starting points 
at all for significantly strengthening the economic base 
in the foreseeable future. The main source of statistics 
8  International Monetary Fund, Greece: Fifth Review Under the Stand-By 
Arrangement, Rephasing and Request for Waivers of Nonobservance of 
Performance Criteria. 2011; Press Release on the Executive. IMF Country Report, 
no. 11/351, 7f. Board Discussion and Statement by the Executive Director for 
Greece.
9  One example of this is the „Helios“ project proposed by the Greek Ministry 
of the Environment, Energy and Climate Change and also supported by the 
faction in the German Bundestag of Alliance 90/the Greens (paper  no. 
17/7098 of the German Bundestag). Solar power production in Greece is to be 
developed but it will have to be subsidized, too. This is something we know 
from the examples of Italy and Spain where the development of power 
production through solar energy facilities has required financial backing. 
Greece does not have the resources to heavily subsidize ongoing production. 
10  Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung: Verantwortung für Europa wahrnehmen. Jahresgutachten 
2011/12, Wiesbaden: 2011.
11  G.A. Horn, F. Lindner, and T. Niechoj, (2011): Schuldenschnitt für 
Griechenland – ein gefährlicher Irrweg für den Euroraum. IMK-Report no. 63, 
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used is the Eurostat database—drawing on the most up-
to-date information available here.12  
low Per capita output
Greece joined the eurozone in 2001. The state has 11.3 
million inhabitants—slightly more than Baden-Würt-
temberg (10.7 million). The per capita economic out-
put in 2010 was 20,100 euros, in 2008—that is, befo-
re the onset of the crisis—it was 20,700 euros. This is 
less than in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (2010: 21,700), 
the German federal state showing the weakest econo-
mic performance. Regarding economic output per per-
son employed, Greece has fared better and, at around 
48,000 euros, exceeded the average of the eastern Ger-
man federal states (46,000 euros) in 2010, but lagged 
significantly behind western Germany (57,400 euros). 
Participation in the labor market is correspondingly re-
latively low: in Greece, persons aged between 15 and 
64, only accounted for a share of just under 60 percent 
in 2010, in the EU as  a whole and in Germany, it was 
77 percent (western Germany: 76 percent; eastern Ger-
many: 80 percent).13
the Road to crisis …
Over the past decade, economic performance in Greece 
rose dramatically. According to Eurostat, from 2000 to 
2008, the real GDP increased by almost a third overall, 
growth in the EU as a whole was at one sixth, and in the 
eurozone at one seventh. In 2009 and 2010, however, 
the price-adjusted value added decreased by a good 3.3 
and 3.5 percent, respectively. A fall of 5.5 percent is an-
ticipated for 2011. The decline beginning in early 2009 
was initially the result of the global financial crisis, then 
further exacerbated by Greece’s specific problems.
There was a strong and steady increase of private expen-
diture up until 2008, and then it fell dramatically (Figu-
re 1). There was a similar development with public expen-
diture: but here, there was no drop until early 2010—af-
ter the expansion had even accelerated in the previous 
12  Particularly in the case of Greece, some of the data presented are 
accompanied by a note that they are based on estimates or that the 
information is to be considered to be preliminary. In other words, there is still 
uncertainty as to the reliability of some of the information. Naturally, the 
shadow economy is completely inadequately captured by the official statistics. 
This is much more significant in Greece than in most European countries. 
Schneider, F. „Size and Development of the Shadow Economy of 31 European 
Countries from 2003 to 2010,“ published manuscript, 2010: www.econ.jku.at/
members/Schneider/files/publications/LatestResearch2010/ShadEcEuro-
pe31_Sept2010_RevisedVersion.pdf.
13  Data source for Greece: Eurostat. For Germany: Working Group on 
Regional Accounts and the Microcensus on Labour Force Participation. 
year. Before disclosure of the actual budget crisis, expen-
diture was still visibly increasing dramatically. Up un-
til early 2004, investments increased more rapidly than 
economic performance, which may well have been not 
least because of expenditure on the Olympic Games.14 
Despite a favorable economic situation, this was follo-
wed by flagging investment activity, which recovered as 
of summer 2005, but cooled off again only two years la-
ter. The development was driven by interest rates which 
were very low due to inflation (Figure 2). 
… Was Paved with massive Foreign trade 
Deficits
The primarily consumer-driven expansion was accompa-
nied by an enormous increase in goods imports (Figure 
3). Although goods exports, starting from a significantly 
lower level, also rose, growth lagged significantly behind 
that of imports. The decline in consumption was then 
followed by a sharp downturn in goods imports, which 
continues today due to constantly shrinking domestic 
demand. Exports also fell temporarily—but not to the 
same extent. From the end of 2009 to the first quarter 
14  The overall cost of the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens and other venues 
was just under nine billion euros, according to a statement of the former Greek 
Finance Minister George Alogoskoufis, that was provided by the Greek Embassy 
in Germany. It is not known how much of this is accounted for by investment—
however, based on past experience with comparable major sporting events, this 
must be where the majority of funding came from. As a comparison, in 2003, 
Greece‘s total gross fixed capital formation was 40 billion euros.
Figure 1
consumption and Investment in Greece 
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1 Including nonprofit organizations serving households.
Source: Eurostat, calculations by DIW Berlin.
© DIW Berlin 2012
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hout the last decade, it was around 90 percent. No other 
country in the EU attained such a high value: all states 
in the Community reached just under 80 percent, with 
a slight increase recently. The countries in the eurozo-
ne were slightly below this value.
strengthening of Export Base Essential
The key to emerging from the crisis is to reduce exter-
nal imbalances by improving economic performance. A 
strategy aiming at import substitution, in other words, 
replacing foreign imports with domestic production, 
can only have limited success, however. Experience with 
such development plans as attempted, for instance, in 
South America from 1930 to 1980 has, for various rea-
sons not to be discussed here, been disappointing.15 In 
the case of Greece, the prerequisites needed for such a 
strategy (in particular, an autonomous monetary and a 
foreign trade policy) are not in place. Moreover, the plan 
has become questionable in view of increasing interna-
tional division of labor.16 Therefore, the only option left 
is to strengthen the export base. 
The extent of the export activity capacity of an econo-
my is dependent on a number of factors: its production 
15  L. Hoffmann, Importsubstitution und wirtschaftliches Wachstum in 
Entwicklungsländern. Tübingen: 1970; Boris, D. Zur Politischen Ökonomie 
Lateinamerikas. Der Kontinent in der Weltwirtschaft des 20. Jahrhunderts. 
Hamburg: 2001.
16  J. Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization. Oxford: 2004.
of 2011, the quarter for which the latest data is current-
ly available, they have more or less stabilized. 
The opposite pattern emerges for services. Up until 
2008, exports were able to increase at a greater rate than 
imports, but then, here, too, the financial crisis had a 
dampening effect. As regards the export of services, 
which are more significant than export of goods, these 
are primarily services provided by the tourist industry 
in Greece because visitors from abroad bring money into 
the country. From the end of 2009 onwards, both ex-
ports and imports stagnated. Therefore, as far as trade 
in services is concerned, there are no serious consequen-
ces of the crisis to be seen to date in Greece. 
In the exchange of services, thanks to its tourist indus-
try, Greece was able to record a surplus throughout the 
whole of the last decade, but this was far from suffici-
ent to compensate for the enormous deficit in the trade 
in goods. According to Eurostat data, in the period from 
2000 to 2010, the foreign trade deficit for goods and 
services amounted in total to one eighth of the GDP on 
average. In 2008, that is, before the crisis, it was even 
one seventh. By now, the deficit is falling because of 
the strong decline in goods imports; in the first quar-
ter of 2011, the foreign trade deficit was still eight per-
cent of the GDP.
The high foreign trade deficit was and is reflected in a 
high consumption ratio—that is, the share of private and 
public spending as a percentage of the GDP. Throug-
Figure 2
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1  Ten-year yield on government bonds less the price increase according to the EU 
harmonized consumer price index. 
Source: Eurostat, calculations by DIW Berlin
© DIW Berlin 2012
Real interest rates in Greece were zero at times.
Figure 3
Greek Foreign trade 
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comestible goods, but even here, the country shows a de-
ficit—even in trade with countries in the EU and with 
Germany.17 This is remarkable, since agriculture plays 
a relatively major role in Greece (Table 2). 
The export base of an economy or region is made up of 
economic activities through which goods that can be tra-
ded between regions or countries are produced and sale 
of these brings in income from other areas. Such activi-
ties generally include, in particular, extraction of certain 
raw materials, a number of sectors of manufacturing, 
including processing of agricultural products, some 
business services and tourism. The statistics availab-
le make no distinction whether the goods produced are 
tradable or not internationally tradable. Nevertheless, 
information about the production structure can be de-
duced from the data.
Weak Industrial Base with strong 
Domestic market Bias
Manufacturing only plays a minor role in the Greek eco-
nomy. In 2012, the entire manufacturing industry only 
generated one tenth of the country’s value added. Only 
the small island state of Cyprus has an even lower fi-
gure, and only in countries such as the UK and France, 
which underwent significant deindustrialization, does 
the manufacturing industry produce the same share as 
in Greece.18 The total Gross Value Added (GVA) of the 
Greek manufacturing industry is only marginally high-
er than the combined figure for the German federal sta-
tes of Thuringia and Saxony-Anhalt. In 2010, industry 
value added  was 1,800 euros per capita which was lo-
wer than in the German federal state of Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern (2,000 euros).19
Within the manufacturing industry, production is re-
latively highly concentrated on a small number of pro-
ducts. The production of comestible goods alone genera-
tes a third of the total net value (Table 3). Wood proces-
sing, paper production and printing works are equally 
significant, as is the production of plastic, glass, and ce-
ramic goods. However, these are all basic goods, which 
17  According to Eurostat, Greece recorded exports of 2.6 billion euros and 
imports of 4.6 billion euros for agricultural products in trade with other EU 
states in 2010. According to the German Federal Statistical Office, there was 
also a trade deficit with Germany amounting to 200 million euros in the same 
year. German exports of agricultural products to Greece were about a third 
higher than imports.
18  On the deindustrialization of France, see M.A. Chatillon (rapporteur), 
„Rapport D’information fait au nom de la mission commune d’information (1) 
sur la désindustrialisation des territoires,“ Ordinary Session of the Senate, 
2010–2011, no. 408 (2011).
19  Sources of data for Greece: Eurostat and for Germany: Working Group on 
Regional Accounts. 
structure and thus the range of goods it can supply, its 
geographical proximity to significant sales markets, and 
also its size. Consequently, companies in big countries 
are less reliant on export trade than providers in small 
countries, thanks to their receptive domestic market. 
Accordingly, the empirical evidence shows a negative 
correlation within the EU between the size of a coun-
try (measured by the population) and the value of ex-
ports in goods and services in relation to the GDP (Fi-
gure 4). There are two notable exceptions—on the one 
hand, Germany, which has very high exports, given its 
size, and on the other hand, Greece, which has relatively 
low exports. Greece also has the lowest export rate of all 
the EU states.
Detailed information about the foreign trade position of 
Greece is available for the movement of goods. For all 
the product groups identified, imports were higher than 
exports (Table 1). It is not surprising that as a country 
poor in raw materials, Greece has a foreign trade defi-
cit for fossil fuels (i.e., oil, gas, coal). However, its posi-
tion concerning mechanical engineering products and 
vehicles is also very weak—imports in 2010 were six 
times higher than exports, and this disparity was even 
greater in previous years. The discrepancies for chemical 
products were significant, but not quite so great—main-
ly because very little was imported. The situation looks 
better for other manufactured goods (not further speci-
fied) which, however, only constitute a very small share 
of foreign trade. Greece is relatively strong in export of 
Figure 4
Export Rates and Population in EU member 
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are normally mainly traded regionally. The mineral oil 
processing industry plays a major role and a significant 
share of its production is exported.20 The production of 
investment goods, on the other hand, is only of very mi-
nor importance. 
A look at the goods with the highest turnover illustra-
tes the strong domestic market bias of the Greek manu-
facturing industry even more clearly. Soft drinks, ciga-
rettes, cheese products, milk and dairy produce, sausa-
ge products, fruit products, baked goods, and printed 
materials (particularly newspapers and magazines), ce-
ment, concrete, and other construction-related products 
(made from wood, plastic and metal, for example) and 
also packaging (made from paper or plastic) are all high-
20  According to the Hellenic Petroleum‘s 2009 Annual Report, Greece‘s 
largest oil refining company, of the total 14.9 million tons produced in that 
year, 3.8 million went into the transit market and 2.3 million was exported.
ly significant. It is more difficult to clearly distinguish 
the sales territory for the various aluminum products 
(including beverage cans) produced in Greece because 
of its bauxite deposits. There are also the remnants of a 
ship building industry (particularly ship repair), a sec-
tor which is at a disadvantage throughout Europe due to 
competition from Asia. Additionally, Greece has a num-
ber of pharmaceutical companies but overall their sales 
volume is insignificant.21
A comparison of the Greek industry and production 
structure with that of imports shows that most imports 
are complementary—competition between domestic 
and imported goods is minimal. 
21  According to Eurostat, total pharmaceutical production turnover in Greece 
in 2009 was just under 900 million euros; by way of comparison, in 
Saxony-Anhalt the equivalent figure for the same year was 1.2 billion euros 
(Statistical Office, Saxony-  Anhalt).
Table 1
Greek Foreign trade by Product Groups
In million euros
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Exports
Comestible goods, tobacco  2 487 2 856 2 321 2 290 2 247 2 602 2 836 3 045 3 452 3 451 3 591
Raw materials 1 015 1 019 791 983 848 1 022 1 420 1 129 1 145 1 012 1 236
Fossil fuels, lubricants 1 751 1 281 924 753 865 1 322 2 171 2 105 2 056 1 363 1 809
Chemical products 1 030 1 145 1 075 1 469 1 637 2 029 2 177 2 365 2 340 2 107 2 364
Other manufactured goods 4 847 4 833 4 308 4 566 4 737 4 784 5 380 5 678 5 988 4 451 4 877
Mechanical engineering products, 
vehicles
1 592 1 536 1 440 1 542 1 666 1 768 2 092 2 291 2 474 2 016 1 938
Unassigned goods 1 179 154 229 306 360 450 591 481 275 465
Total 12 723 12 848 11 013 11 830 12 306 13 888 16 525 17 204 17 937 14 675 16 280
Imports
Comestible goods, tobacco  3 880 4 096 4 066 4 273 4 541 4 662 5 134 5 749 6 151 5 726 5 534
Raw materials 893 1 025 1 054 1 073 1 194 1 234 1 395 1 817 2 002 1 240 1 420
Fossil fuels, lubricants 4 398 5 076 4 522 5 437 5 383 7 888 9 713 9 915 13 475 8 382 11 543
Chemical products 4 215 4 550 3 655 5 018 5 721 6 356 6 924 7 744 8 414 7 741 7 286
Other manufactured goods 9 783 10 030 8 955 9 820 10 914 11 049 12 963 15 089 16 097 11 823 10 700
Mechanical engineering products, 
vehicles
12 992 12 017 11 072 13 984 14 618 12 502 14 375 16 548 16 693 14 838 11 538
Unassigned goods 89 74 63 45 42 66 164 441 114 40 34
Total 36 249 36 868 33 387 39 650 42 415 43 755 50 668 57 302 62 945 49 791 48 055
Balance
Comestible goods, tobacco  –1 393 –1 240 –1 745 –1 983 –2 294 –2 060 –2 298 –2 704 –2 699 –2 275 –1 943
Raw materials 122 –6 –263 –90 –346 –212 25 –688 –857 –228 –184
Fossil fuels, lubricants –2 647 –3 795 –3 598 –4 684 –4 518 –6 566 –7 542 –7 810 –11 419 –7 019 –9 734
Chemical products –3 185 –3 405 –2 580 –3 549 –4 084 –4 327 –4 747 –5 379 –6 074 –5 634 –4 922
Other manufactured goods –4 936 –5 197 –4 647 –5 254 –6 177 –6 265 –7 583 –9 411 –10 109 –7 372 –5 823
Mechanical engineering products, 
vehicles
–11 400 –10 481 –9 632 –12 442 –12 952 –10 734 –12 283 –14 257 –14 219 –12 822 –9 600
Unassigned goods –88 105 91 184 264 294 286 150 367 235 431
Total –23 526 –24 020 –22 374 –27 820 –30 109 –29 867 –34 143 –40 098 –45 008 –35 116 –31 775
Source: Eurostat, calculations by DIW Berlin.
© DIW Berlin 20129 DIW Economic Bulletin 3.2012
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Prominent Role of tourism
Official government statistics provide no direct infor-
mation about the economic significance of the tourist 
industry. This is because a number of branches of the 
economy are linked with the tourist trade, but no details 
are available on the exact contribution tourism makes 
to these branches' economic output. Industries provi-
ding tourist services include parts of the transport in-
dustry and health economy. The retail trade also be-
nefits. However, it is simplest to use statistical infor-
mation from the hospitality industry as an indicator of 
tourism, even though this only captures part of the tou-
rist industry’s economic output, and some of the reve-
nue from this branch of the economy also has to be as-
signed to domestic demand.
The small-scale structure of the Greek economy is par-
ticularly striking. Almost half of all those employed in 
the manufacturing industry work for companies with fe-
wer than 10 employees (Table 5).22 In all other EU mem-
ber states, small enterprises are much less prominent. 
On the other hand, there are barely any larger compa-
nies in Greece; businesses with 250 employees or more 
only provide a fifth of all jobs. This is further evidence 
that companies operating in the manufacturing indust-
ry in Greece have a strong domestic market bias as small 
enterprises generally have a sales radius that is confi-
ned to a smaller territory and often lack the capacity to 
operate on foreign markets.
22  Data is only currently available up to 2007. This should, however, be 
sufficient for this study as size structures only tend to change very slowly.
Table 2
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EU 1.7 14.9 3.1 1.8 1.4 0.5
Belgium 0.7 1.7 1.7 1.2 0.3
Czech Republic 1.7 23.3 1.9 2.1 1.7 0.3
Denmark 1.3 11.5 1.4 2.1 1.8 0.6
Germany 0.8 20.9 1.6 1.7 1.4 0.4
Estonia 3.3 16.4 1.1 1.9 1.3 0.6
Ireland 1.7 25.8 2.1 1.4 0.1
Greece 3.1 10.0 6.8 0.4 0.9 0.3
Spain 2.6 12.9 7.2 1.2 1.3 0.1
France 1.7 10.0 2.6 2.2 1.6 1.0
Italy 1.9 16.0 4.1 1.6 0.9 0.6
Cyprus 2.4 6.4
Latvia 4.5 13.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 0.2
Lithuania 3.3 18.8 1.4 0.8 1.0 0.3
Hungary 3.8 22.3 1.5 1.8 1.2 0.4
Malta 1.8 13.5
Netherlands 1.8 12.3 1.7 2.2 1.5 0.4
Austria 1.5 17.5 4.9 1.4 1.3 0.2
Poland 3.8 16.8 1.2
Portugal 2.2 12.7 5.01 1.0 0.9 0.4
Romania 6.7 22.0 1.91 1.0 1.0 0.3
Slovenia 2.5 19.4 2.2 1.5 2.1 0.6
Slovakia 3.1 23.6 1.1 1.8 1.2 0.3
Finland 3.0 18.0 1.7 2.2 1.7 0.6
Sweden 1.8 15.8 1.51 2.7
UK 0.6 10.0
1  Data from 2009.
Source: Eurostat, calculations by DIW Berlin.
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In 2010, the accomodation and food service activities ac-
counted for almost seven percent of the Greek net pro-
duct; this is more than twice the EU average. Among tho-
se countries for which information is available, only the 
Spanish tourist industry contributes a higher share. Ap-
proximately three quarters of the hospitality industry’s 
output is produced by international tourism based on 
the ratio of overnight hotel stays by foreign tourists to 
total overnight stays. However, the hospitality industry 
does not represent the entire tourist industry; the Ger-
man hospitality industry, for example, provides approxi-
mately 40 percent of services to foreign tourists.23 If we 
transpose this share onto Greece, then foreign tourism 
generates between a tenth and an eighth of the country’s 
net product. This means that foreign tourism is slightly 
more significant for the Greek economy as a whole than 
the manufacturing industry but considerably more im-
portant if we take the export base into account, as ma-
nufacturing industry output in Greece is focused pri-
marily on the domestic market.
Foreign tourism is highly dependent on economic 
trends. This is why the global financial crisis had such 
a negative impact on business in Europe’s key tourist 
countries (based on the number of overnight stays) (Ta-
ble 6). During the economic upturn which preceded the 
crisis, on the other hand, mostly strong growth was ob-
served. However, since the crisis, foreign tourism has 
begun to recover again—also in Greece. Moreover, the-
re are certain developments, independent of economic 
trends, which are dictated by tourists’ preferences: over 
the last decade, some key tourist destinations such as 
Spain have become less attractive to foreign visitors, 
while others, such as Italy, have managed to attract more 
foreign tourists. Greece has also experienced a slight 
upward trend.
Tourism is currently on a worldwide growth trend alt-
hough growth of European tourism is below average.24 
Focusing on the Mediterranean region, tourism in eu-
rozone countries such as Greece has to compete with 
those countries both outside the EU (Croatia, North Af-
rica) and also within the EU but outside the eurozone 
(Bulgaria), which are able to provide tourist services at 
more favorable prices, and also with countries that have 
managed to capture market shares by significantly ex-
panding capacity, such as Turkey.25
23  F. Pavel, Wirtschaftsfaktor Tourismus. Ein modulares Tourismus-
  Satellitenkonto (TSA) zur Berechnung der Wertschöpfungs- und Beschäftigungs-
effekte der Tourismuswirtschaft in Deutschland. Berlin: 2012.
24  See UNWTO, „Tourism Barometer,“ Statistical Annex, no. 10 (January 
2012).
25  Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Investment Support and 
Promotion Agency of Turkey, Turkish Tourism Industry Report (2010). 
Table 3
structure of Gross value added in the manufacturing Industry in 
2010
In percent 
Production or manufacture of... Greece EU
Comestible goods; beverages, tobacco 33.3 13.7
Textiles, clothing, leather, leather goods 4.7 4.1
Wood and paper, printed matter 10.3 7.3
Mineral oil 10.5 1.2
Chemical products (excluding mineral oil etc.) 4.3 6.9
Pharmaceutical products 5.6 4.6
Rubber and plastic products, glass, ceramics, stone and earth 8.0 9.0
Metal, metal products 12.5 14.2
Data processing devices, electronic, and optical products 0.6 4.4
Electrical equipment 2.5 5.4
Machinery 2.0 10.9
Cars and car parts; other vehicles 1.9 9.4
Furniture, jewelry, musical instruments, toys; repairs 3.8 9.0
Total 100 100
Source: Eurostat, calculations by DIW Berlin.
© DIW Berlin 2012
Food production accounts for a third of the Greek net product.
Table 4
Industrial Goods manufactured in Greece1 with the highest 
Revenue in 2009  
In million euros
Rank Prodcom-code Commodity group Revenue 
1 110 Beverages 1 436.6
2 105 Milk and dairy products  1 428.8
3 244 Aluminum and copper products 1 034.7
4 235 Cement, lime, plaster 949.7
5 212 Medicinal drugs 886.2
6 103 Products from fruit and vegetable processing  868.5
7 222 Plastic products 763.2
8 108 Sugar, confectionary, cocoa, coffee, convenience foods 712.0
9 107 Baked goods, pastry goods 700.4
10 241 Iron, ferrous products 688.7
11 181 Printed matter 646.6
12 251 Structural metal products, metal joinery elements 638.4
13 236 Concrete construction products, limestone, plaster 609.4
14 101 Products from meat processing 608.5
15 120 Cigarettes, tobacco 480.4
16 106 Flour, other milled products, starch 453.8
17 172 Products from paper and cardboard processing  426.0
18 204 Soap, detergents, personal hygiene products 351.1
19 331 Repairs (of ships, boats, machinery) 349.8
20 104 Food oils and fats, margarine 341.1
1  Does not include goods produced by companies subject to confidentiality due to small sample size (fewer 
than three).
Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority, calculations by DIW Berlin.
© DIW Berlin 2012
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However, as engineering services are often linked with 
the supply of goods (in plant construction, for instance), 
we can assume that this sector has a low rate of export 
in Greece. Research services are also frequently corre-
lated with the demand for manufacturing goods. Gree-
ce also only has a very small number of software pro-
duction and IT service companies.
small-scale Economic structure
Economies of scale play a significant role in internatio-
nal competition as large-scale production is generally ac-
companied by lower marginal costs. National economies 
where small enterprises are of central importance are, 
therefore, invariably at a disadvantage—provided that 
the small companies do not represent a wave of start-
Foreign tourism in Greece is hugely seasonal, which 
leads to low capacity utilization and relatively high costs. 
In the summer months from July to September, for ex-
ample, the number of overnight stays by foreign tou-
rists was over 30 times higher than in the months from 
December to February.26 In other tourist areas in, for 
instance, Northern Europe and probably also overseas, 
seasonal fluctuations are not as dramatic. In Italy, the 
equivalent ratio is 4 to 1, and in both Spain and Portu-
gal, it is 3 to 1. In Austria, the ratio is 1 to 1.
Labor costs play a comparatively minor role in the Greek 
hospitality industry. In 2010, wages only constituted a 
sixth of the hospitality industry’s GVA, while in Spain 
this figure was a third, and in Italy, almost a half. This 
is only partially due to wage levels. According to Euros-
tat, the hourly wage in the hospitality industry in 2008 
(the most recent available information) was 15.76 euros 
in Italy, 12.83 euros in Spain, and 11.39 euros in Greece. 
The hourly wage in this industry was only 8.49 euros in 
Portugal, for example, 4.00 euros in Turkey, and as low 
as 1.55 euros in Bulgaria. The low share of labor costs in 
Greece is mainly a result of a relatively large number of 
self-employed people working in the hospitality indus-
try. In 2010, half of all those working in the hospitality 
industry in Greece were self-employed—in the EU as 
a whole, this figure was a sixth, in Italy a third, and in 
Spain a quarter. Prices are, therefore, heavily dependent 
on self-employment earnings and building costs. 
very Few high-Quality Business services 
Another component of the export base are certain busi-
ness services, including consulting and engineering ser-
vices which are sold abroad, and also software develop-
ment or commercial research and development. These 
are essentially high-value goods. In Greece in 2012, en-
gineering firms generated 0.6 percent of the total GVA 
and research and development companies 0.3 percent, 
which is very low by international standards. There are 
no statistics available for Greece on the sales in these 
sectors from a regional perspective. In Germany, engi-
neering firms have an export ratio of 16 percent (2009 
sales revenues from customers based abroad), and com-
mercial research and development companies exports 
a fifth of all their services.27 Even if Greece realized the 
same export rates as Germany, this sector would still 
only play a rather minor role in Greek foreign trade. 
26  Calculation based on Eurostat data. In Austria, for example, the ratio is 
1:1.
27  German Federal Statistical Office, „Dienstleistungen. Strukturerhebungen 
im Dienstleistungsbereich. Erbringung von freiberuflichen, wissenschaftlichen 
und technischen Dienstleistungen 2009,“ Series 9, Row 4.4 (2009).
Table 5
Distribution of Employment in the manufacturing Industry  
by company size in 2007
Share in percent 
Companies with … employees
1 to 9 10 to 19 20 to 49 50 to 249 250 and above
Greece 46 4 9 20 21
Cyprus 32 14 17 23 13
Italy 25 15 16 21 22
Portugal 21 12 19 29 18
Spain 18 11 20 24 27
Poland 18 4 9 28 42
Netherlands 16 9 15 28 32
Hungary 14 7 11 25 43
Slovenia 13 5 9 27 46
Czech Republic 13 6 10 27 44
France 12 7 12 22 47
Belgium 12 6 13 24 45
UK 11 7 12 26 43
Sweden 11 6 10 23 50
Austria 10 7 11 26 46
Latvia 10 9 17 38 27
Estonia 10 8 17 38 27
Bulgaria 10 7 15 35 33
Lithuania 10 8 15 35 33
Finland 9 6 10 24 51
Romania 8 6 12 29 46
Denmark 8 6 12 28 46
Germany 7 8 7 25 53
Ireland 6 6 13 30 45
Luxembourg 5 5 8 23 60
Slovakia 5 5 8 26 56
Source: Eurostat, calculations by DIW Berlin.
© DIW Berlin 2012
The Greek manufacturing industry is strongly characterized by small enterprises.DIW Economic Bulletin 3.2012 12
GREEk Economy nEEDs GRoWth stRatEGy
ups leading to the beginning of a growth process, which 
is not the case in Greece. The structure of Greek enter-
prises represents a gradual development. 
As has already been shown, small enterprises play an 
exceptionally important role in the Greek manufactu-
ring industry. As can be seen from the rate of self-em-
ployment as a share of total employment, this pheno-
menon also extends into other branches of the Greek 
economy. In 2010, the aforementioned rate of self-em-
ployment (including family workers) as a share of total 
employment was 30 percent (Figure 5).28 If public admi-
nistration is excluded, this figure is almost 40 percent 
(Figure 6). This represents the highest rate in the EU. 
All other member states have a far lower self-employ-
ment rate. There is also evidence that a higher self-em-
ployment rate is generally an indicator of economic un-
derdevelopment as there is a slight negative correlation 
28  The share has fallen over the last decade; in 2000, it was two percentage 
points higher.
between the self-employment rate and economic growth 
per capita in EU member states.29
Self-employment rates are particularly high in agricul-
ture and fisheries, the hospitality industry, professi-
onal and also scientific and technical services, trade, 
and the transport industry. In the construction indust-
ry, the rate is lower but even here, there is still one self-
employed worker for every employee. Even in manufac-
turing, the ratio is three to one. As expected, there are 
barely any self-employed workers in the energy and wa-
ter supply sector. 
conclusion
For a long time, Greece has been living beyond its me-
ans. Consumption of goods has far exceeded economic 
output. This development was not triggered by entry to 
29  K. Brenke, „Solo-Selbständige in Deutschland – Strukturen und 
Erwerbsverläufe. Untersuchung für das Bundesministerium für Arbeit und 
Soziales,“ (in preparation) (2012).
Table 6
overnight stays made by non-Residents in tourist accommodations  
Greece Spain Italy Portugal France Austria Germany
Millionen
2000 47.0 233.9 140.4 25.8 108.8 64.5 42.4
2001 42.5 231.4 146.7 25.2 110.3 65.5 40.6
2002 41.0 220.7 145.6 25.1 113.2 67.3 40.4
2003 40.4 217.9 139.7 24.9 103.7 68.2 41.6
2004 38.8 209.1 141.2 24.6 104.2 68.3 45.4
2005 40.7 209.5 148.3 25.4 108.0 69.7 48.2
2006 43.1 224.5 156.9 26.8 105.9 70.0 52.9
2007 48.1 225.5 163.5 28.7 108.6 71.5 54.5
2008 48.0 223.8 161.8 28.1 107.0 74.7 56.2
2009 46.7 200.6 159.5 25.0 98.7 72.2 54.1
2010 49.0 213.3 165.2 25.4 120.4 66.8 59.7
2000 = 100
2001 90 99 104 98 101 102 96
2002 87 94 104 97 104 104 95
2003 86 93 99 96 95 106 98
2004 83 89 101 95 96 106 107
2005 87 90 106 98 99 108 114
2006 92 96 112 104 97 109 125
2007 102 96 116 111 100 111 128
2008 102 96 115 109 98 116 133
2009 99 86 114 97 91 112 128
2010 104 91 118 98 111 104 141
Source: Eurostat, calculations by DIW Berlin.
© DIW Berlin 2012
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the eurozone, but is rather a consequence of the signi-
ficant foreign trade deficits which, according to official 
data recently published by the Hellenic Statistical Au-
thority, have been accumulating at least since the mid-
90s.30 Entry to the euro simply accelerated the excessi-
ve consumption of goods, as a lax monetary policy and 
the banks’ generous lending provided incentives for a 
large increase in private and public consumption. Evi-
dently, the government was responsible for channeling 
money from abroad and then redistributing it. When, 
at the end of 2009, it became clear that public debt was 
far higher than initially indicated, capital market ope-
rators lost confidence in the Greek government. Howe-
ver, this was just the trigger. At some point in the very 
near future, there would have been a proverbial straw to 
30  The oldest data that could be found were for 1995; at that time, the 
current account deficit was a substantial seven percent of the GDP.
break the camel’s back in any case. The eurozone mem-
ber states and international institutions are essentially 
on track to becoming Greece’s only creditors—apart 
from loans from private investors, which, since the re-
duction in Greek debt, are tied up in the long term. Re-
financing of the country’s capital market is currently 
not an option and this will continue to be the case in 
the medium term.
This raises the question as to why Greece was even gran-
ted credit for such a long time. On the one hand, ent-
ry to the eurozone played a part as it meant that credi-
tors were no longer exposed to the risk of devaluation 
of the national currency and thus also state debt. On 
the other hand, as is so often the case in history, natio-
nal insolvency was never deemed to be credible—espe-
cially not in Europe. 
Figure 5
self-Employment1 as a share of total 
Employment in 2010
Share in percent

























1  Including family workers.
Source: Eurostat, calculations by DIW Berlin.
© DIW Berlin 2012
The Greek self-employment rate as a share of total employment is 
considerably higher than average.
Figure 6
self-Employment1 as a share of total Employment in selected 
Industries in Greece in 2010
Share in percent








Trade; maintenance of automobiles
Transport and storage
Accomodation, food service activities
Information, communication
Financial services
Real estate and housing
Other economic services
Education and teaching






1  Including family workers. 
2  Excluding public administration, social security, defense.
Source: Eurostat, calculations by DIW Berlin.
© DIW Berlin 2012
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The industrial base is extremely weak and manufactu-
ring industry production is primarily focused on the do-
mestic market. Small-scale industries are always parti-
cularly strongly focused on local sales, as, all over the 
world, there is demand for goods which are, to a cer-
tain degree, produced locally (perishable foodstuffs, dai-
ly newspapers, or goods with high transportation costs 
such as concrete components). Greece’s trade in goods 
with Germany, for example, is clearly complementa-
ry and, because there is very little reciprocal competiti-
on, the weak wage development in Germany does not 
place the Greek automobile industry under pressure, as 
it simply does not exist. Consumers are even less like-
ly to purchase olive oil produced in Germany. Only the 
poor development of mass income in Germany and the 
resulting fall in consumer demand may have had an im-
pact on Greece. Wage development in Germany is only 
likely to have caused problems for countries which have 
substitutive trade relations with Germany i.e., countries 
producing goods which are similar to those manufactu-
red in Germany for export. 
It is essential for Greece to broaden its industrial base. 
As the situation in the East German federal states illus-
trates, this is a long-term goal and achieving this has 
enormously high cost implications. However, compara-
ble financial resources are simply not available. If such 
resources were to be mobilized by the EU, other coun-
tries would then also request similar assistance—par-
ticularly as unilateral financial support for the Greek 
economy would lead to competitive disadvantages in 
other regions. Any comparison with eastern Germany 
is invalid inasmuch as the focus there was on reindus-
trialization whereas in Greece progress first needs to 
be made with industrialization. The eastern German 
states, and also some eastern European countries, al-
ready had an industrial tradition and thus had access 
to extensive knowledge, significant qualified industri-
al labor force potential, and an industry-oriented infra-
structure, particularly in higher education. The Greek 
economy possesses nothing of the kind. The manufac-
turing industry, like other branches of the economy, is 
driven to a great extent by small enterprises. The em-
ployment structure with its high self-employment rate 
is more typical of emerging markets. The preconditions 
for the necessary industrialization are, therefore, not ex-
actly in place.
Over the last decade, on average, aggregate financial as-
sistance flowing from the EU into Greece amounted to 
over two percent of economic output. This assistance 
was provided by EU programs concentrating on redis-
tribution, or, in the case of individual industries, on 
preserving existing structures—from both a regional 
and social point of view. It has gradually become clear 
Even during the current crisis, Greece is continuing to 
accumulate debts abroad because it still consumes and 
invests more than it produces in spite of the fact that con-
sumption has already been dramatically reduced. If con-
sumption were to be cut even further, production, which 
has a strong domestic market bias in Greece, would also 
fall and the economy would find itself in even more of a 
downward spiral. Measures to consolidate government 
finances should, therefore, not be put on the back bur-
ner. Such steps include the development of a more effec-
tive administration and an efficient system of taxation 
as well as the privatization of state property. Infrastruc-
ture facilities can only be privatized as far as regulatory 
policies allow. Further tax increases are also an option, 
particularly those focusing on high income and wealth, 
which are, therefore, less likely to have a damaging ef-
fect on overall economic demand. However, such mea-
sures can only alleviate Greece’s problems. 
First and foremost, it is essential that the country’s eco-
nomic base is strengthened. Due to its large external 
deficit, it is not enough for Greece to be able to balan-
ce its export trade—in the medium-term it needs to ac-
cumulate a surplus in order to be able to pay off its re-
maining debt. Economists who claim that the drama-
tic wage increases in Greece, and particularly the wage 
restraint in Germany, undermined the competitive po-
sition of Greek producers, have not put their finger on 
the real problem. Entire national economies do not com-
pete with one another, it is only sectors or industries 
that do this, and Greece simply has an extremely limi-
ted export base. 
An important component of the Greek export base is 
tourism, which, in comparison with other Southern Eu-
ropean countries, has experienced rather favorable de-
velopment.31 Wages do not play a particularly dominant 
role in this sector, particularly in Greece. The general 
price level, which, in turn, depends on the exchange 
rate poses a greater problem—in comparison with Tur-
key, for example. As a massive wage reduction is not re-
ally possible, the price level can be beaten down at best 
through currency devaluation. Other measures to extend 
the season could have a positive impact on Greek tou-
rism (expansion of health-related tourism, for examp-
le). However, such measures require significant invest-
ment. It is unlikely that tourism could become the main 
pillar of the export base although the situation may dif-
fer for a small number of Greek regions. Furthermore, 
Greece has very few attractive city tourism destinations, 
and city tourism is booming worldwide.
31  H. Flassbeck and F. Spieker, „Die griechische Krise hat deutsche Wurzeln,“ 
Financial Times Deutschland, December 11, 2009; Horn, Lindner, and Niechoj, 
„Schuldenschnitt für Griechenland.“ 15 DIW Economic Bulletin 3.2012
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that Greece, like a number of other countries, needs a 
growth policy as a matter of priority.
Greece will continue to be a problem child for Europe 
for some time. On the one hand, the country carries an 
enormous debt burden which must be rapidly reduced. 
On the other hand, Greece needs to expand those parts 
of its economic base that would strengthen its position in 
the international division of labor and this involves a pro-
tracted process. A significant reduction in the cost and 
price levels in Greece in comparison with other coun-
tries would certainly help the situation. In any event, a 
sustainable growth concept is essential for Greece. This 
is something that can only be developed and implemen-
ted by the country’s national government. The interna-
tional community will gradually become the country’s 
only creditor, and Greece will be reliant on long-term 
drip-feeding and external support.
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